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Abstract 
We model 73.62 million London Stock Exchange (LSE) trades with a combined transaction 
value of £5.45 ($8.96) trillion. We show that the LSE’s high failure rate to open at the 
opening call auction only relates to low volume stocks. Evidence suggests that traders opt to 
hold off trading until the floor opens at 08:00hrs; this decision seems connected to the need to 
avoid the informed traders who dominate the opening auction. For the largest volume stocks, 
the opening call auction provides highly efficient opening prices, while the lower volume 
stocks attain similar levels of price efficiency only after the start of the normal trading hours 
(NTH). At the close however, all stocks only lose small fractions of informational efficiency 
achieved during the NTH. Opening prices may influence trader sentiment throughout the 
trading day, and opening/closing prices may be the basis for settling derivative contracts, they 
are therefore of great importance.     
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 1. Introduction 
The question of how financial instruments’ prices develop on financial platforms has 
fascinated both academic researchers and practitioners for decades. The introduction of 
computer-aided trading, and relatively more recently, algorithmic trading, has only increased 
this interest. The process of generating a fair price for an instrument can be quite complicated 
given the reasonable probability of informed trading. However, decades of relentless 
technological advancement has led to the development of ultra-quick information 
dissemination processes, which now feed directly into platform trades. The proliferation of 
information dissemination structures such as bespoke real-time trading information providers 
and 24-hour financial markets news channels such as CNBC and Bloomberg, has now led to 
an unprecedented timely release of information to the market place. These streams of data 
feed directly into trading algorithmic trading strategies, which have been shown to improve 
trading quality by narrowing spreads, reducing adverse selection and enhancing the 
informativeness of quotes (see Hendershott et al., 2011). Even with these advancements, 
establishing an opening reference price after a market closure can still be a challenging 
process. Market closure may be due to the close of regular trading, trading suspensions or 
temporary halts. For traders, establishing a fair price after such closures is critical to trading 
strategy. The importance of the pre-open to price discovery is demonstrated by Biais et al. 
(1999) and Cao et al. (2000) who show evidence of ‘learning’ through the posting of non-
binding quotes on the Paris Bourse and NASDAQ respectively. 
 
One may argue that the significance of the opening price has been reduced by the rise of 
Electronic Communication Network (ECNs), which makes after hours trading possible, albeit 
with higher levels of informed trading and lower trading volumes (see for example Barclay 
and Hendershott, 2003). The price discovery process during the after hours trading period is 
also fraught with inefficiencies relative to the normal trading hours (NTH) session. The prices 
 are more volatile, the adverse selection costs are higher, along with attendant information 
asymmetry, and thus spreads are generally wider. Barclay and Hendershott (2003) thus find 
that price efficiency after hours is less than during the NTH because very little new 
information is released while trading is also thin. Therefore, even if post-NTH trading does 
provide some foundation for opening prices, most market participants are unlikely to trade on 
that basis because of the noise levels during the price discovery process once the market has 
officially closed. This underscores the significance of the opening price and the process that 
generates it. Thus markets around the world have evolved their opening practices in order to 
facilitate the efficiency of the price discovery process. The most widely adopted pre-open 
mechanism by platforms has been the call auction. In this paper we will examine how the call 
auction contributes to the pricing efficiency on a hybrid market, the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). On the LSE’s Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS), there is direct 
competition between the broker-dealer market, market makers and investors who submit limit 
orders. This is an interesting mix that naturally should enhance market quality. The 
introduction of the call auction mechanism to open, as the LSE has done, should also 
contribute to the efficiency of the opening price.   
 
A stream of literature has examined the impact of the introduction of opening and closing call 
auctions on market quality. However, to our knowledge there is no linkage between 
informational efficiency and other market quality characteristics evolving in the opening 
auction to the NTH market efficiency within an intraday modelling framework. The general 
approach has been to test whether the introduction or evolution of a trading 
system/mechanism positively or negatively influences market characteristics.  A number of 
these studies mainly adopt an event study framework employing daily data (opening and 
closing prices) rather than conducting detailed intraday analyses. Thus none of the 
 contributions have actually examined these issues on an intraday basis using high frequency 
trading data.  Further, most of the focus has been on the introduction of closing auctions 
rather than opening auctions. For example, Chelley-Steeley (2008) and Chelley-Steeley 
(2009) investigate the market quality impact of the introduction of the closing auction on the 
LSE. Both studies document market quality improvements based on daily level data. The 
studies however do not isolate the direct market quality impacts of auction trades during the 
opening or closing call auction periods on continuous trading during the NTH. Pagano and 
Schwartz (2003) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2007) examine the introduction of the closing 
auction on the Paris Bourse and the Singapore Stock Exchange respectively; both papers 
suggest that the introduction of the call closing auction improves market quality. Comerton-
Forde et al. (2007) also consider the impact of the closing auction in tandem with the opening 
auction without decomposing the impacts since both were introduced during the same month, 
and their study also employ daily data in an event study context. Another study, which 
focuses on the Singapore Stock Exchange, is Chang et al. (2008); they confirm the “spillover 
effect”, which was first documented by Pagano and Schwartz (2003) based on their analysis 
of trading on the Paris Bourse. 
 
Since previous literature streams support the notion that the introduction of call auction 
enhances market quality, the past decade has seen the introduction of call auctions for 
closing, and in many cases as well, the opening of trading venues across the world. There is a 
strong theoretical argument for congregating all available market liquidity at a single point in 
order to determine the fair price of an instrument. Schwartz (2001) asserts that this enhances 
the accuracy of the price discovery process. The view that the efficiency of the price 
discovery process is inextricably linked with liquidity is widely supported in the literature 
and has been further established by Chordia et al. (2008) amongst others. According to 
 Madhavan (1992), since all traders are given access to the same prices at the same time, call 
auctions reduce information asymmetry. However, this comes at higher information (and thus 
transaction) costs over time as auctions can only be periodic at best. Barclay et al. (2008) also 
show that the consolidation of orders, which occurs during a call auction, rather than the 
nearness of traders, or the involvement of market makers, is the vital factor for price 
efficiency in a market opening. Further, their results imply that call auctions are more likely 
to absorb extreme liquidity shock without yielding inefficient prices and volatility. Amihud et 
al. (1990) find on the Milan Stock Exchange that when a continuous trading period is 
preceded by a call auction, volatility associated with that continuous trading session is lower 
than if it had not been preceded by a call auction. The improvement in market quality, usually 
associated with reduced volatility, perhaps explains why Schnitzlein’s (1996) experimental 
study finds that under a call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price 
efficiency, there is a reduction in adverse selection costs incurred by uninformed traders. 
Interestingly however, empirical evidence presented by Ellul et al. (2005) suggests that call 
markets are less suited than the dealership system to deal with adverse selection. They also 
find that on days when uncertainty is higher, there is increased migration from the call market 
to the dealership during the LSE pre-open, suggesting that traders prefer the dealership when 
information asymmetry is on the rise. They argue that small stocks/orders traders are more 
likely to trade using the dealership rather than the call because they are more likely to find 
counterparties by using that option (coordination theory). Somewhat contradictorily, their 
results also indicate that small orders obtain lower transaction costs on the call market when 
compared to the dealership.  Thus one would expect small stocks/orders traders to prefer the 
call market at the open and close, and that this should drive the availability of counterparties 
in the auction system for small stocks. Despite a number of contributions addressing issues 
around the use of the call auction to open or close, only a few published papers have 
 examined inter-temporal links between the opening auction and continuous trading sessions. 
Brooks and Moulton (2004) provide evidence on interactions between the opening auction on 
an exchange, the NYSE, and the continuous regular trading day.  Yet even then they only 
focus on trading activities such as volume. Volume in itself does not imply liquidity or 
market efficiency; Johnson (2008) shows that volume and liquidity are unrelated over time 
and Chordia et al. (2008) show that liquidity is inextricably linked to market efficiency.  
 
Our study is related to both Ellul et al. (2005) and Barclay et al. (2008). However, this paper 
is different as they focus on the comparison of two different trading mechanisms/options, 
whilst we focus on how the price discovery and other relevant trading parameters from one 
mechanism evolve as the market shifts to a different trading mechanism. Specifically, Ellul et 
al. (2005) and Barclay et al. (2008) focus on traders’ selection of trading mechanism(s) and 
the market’s capacity to absorb order imbalances respectively.2 We are motivated differently; 
our aim is to first examine the efficiency levels of the opening price and how that evolves as 
the continuous trading period commences. This examination should shed some light on 
whether the opening auction period contributes to the NTH in terms of efficient price 
discovery. This main focus is also partially influenced by the findings of Barclay and 
Hendershott (2008). In their paper, which compares trading and non-trading mechanisms of 
price discovery, they suggest that the pre-open trading on NASDAQ contributes to the 
efficiency of the opening price. We aim to find out whether this holds true on the LSE where 
the pre-open is structured such that the opening price is determined by a call auction, and the 
NTH is a continuous order-driven market. If informed traders do not employ the opening call 
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 Our research questions may also be linked to Amihud et al. (1990). However, the Milan Stock Exchange call 
method on which their study is based is significantly different from the one we study. Further, there are 
significant differences in the methodological approach they employ and ours; this is further amplified by the 
thin trading observed on the Milan stock exchange at the time of their study.    
 auction, given high failure rates to open, as implied by Ellul et al. (2005)
3
, then the pre-open 
price on the LSE may not provide a more informative or efficient opening price than say the 
first 10-20 minutes of the NTH. If indeed, the opening auction/pre-open contributes to market 
quality during the NTH, then we expect the price efficiency for this period to be higher than, 
or equal to, other 10-minute periods across the NTH. Specifically, our contributions to this 
literature area are encapsulated by the four questions we pose in this paper: (1) what 
proportion of price information relative to the trading day is revealed during the opening call 
auction/pre-open and the closing call auction? (2) How informationally efficient relative to 
the NTH is the opening call auction/pre-open and closing auction price on the LSE? (3) More 
specifically, how noisy is the pricing process during the pre-open price relative to the NTH? 
(4) And finally, do informed traders drive the price discovery process during the pre-open?  
 
We find that the SETS pre-open price is only informative for the highest volume stocks, 
while for the low volume stocks, price discovery only really starts after the market open as 
there is a high rate of failure to open at the call for small volume stocks. Further the dealer-
broker trades entered during the pre-open reveal very little information, which is not 
significantly different from zero. Given the noise levels in the dealer-broker trades, only the 
highest volume stocks that succeed at the call are able to post significantly high levels of 
informational price efficiency. For all stocks however, there is a high level of price efficiency 
during the NTH, which only declines slightly after the NTH. We also find that small volume 
stock traders likely shun the opening call auction because of the high level of information 
asymmetry/informed trading occurring during the period. Thus, the decision to avoid the 
opening call may be due to the need to avoid trading in an environment dominated by 
informed traders. 
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 Friederich and Payne (2007:1176)  even went as far as stating that: “The opening batch auctions in particular 
were never successful in London…”. 
  
2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Trading on the London Stock Exchange 
Until 1997 the LSE functioned as a pure dealership market. The market was heavily criticised 
for its lack of transparency and the high transaction costs imposed on low level investors. In 
response to the criticisms, on the 20
th
 October 1997, the LSE introduced an electronic order-
matching system called the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) for all FTSE 
100 stocks. The FTSE 100 includes the largest firms by market value as listed on the LSE, 
and they account for about 81% of the total market capitalisation on the exchange. 
Subsequently, in September 1999, the most liquid FTSE 250 stocks were also migrated to 
SETS. The introduction of SETS on the LSE encapsulates a shift from a strictly quote driven 
market to an order driven one. The SETS has since grown to become one of the most liquid 
electronic order books in the world. In addition to FTSE 100 stocks, it now incorporates 
trades in all FTSE 250 stocks along with the FTSE Small Cap constituents, ETFs as well as 
other less liquid instruments. 
 
Floor trading is preceded by a 10-minute call auction period at 07:50:00hrs London local 
time. However, generally during the pre-open (including prior to the opening auction), dealer 
trades can also be reported. During the pre-open, limit and market orders may be entered and 
deleted at will, and all order book data are communicated to the market. In advance of the 
batch auction at 08:00:00hrs, the order book is suspended, and no further orders can be 
entered. An uncrossing algorithm subsequently runs to facilitate execution of orders at prices 
that maximise the volume of instruments traded. Once the buy and sell orders are crossed, 
indicative uncrossing prices for each instrument are displayed as the corresponding opening 
prices for the NTH. Extensions to the opening auction can be activated under two scenarios. 
 First, a Market Order Extension (MOE) could be activated for two minutes plus random 30-
second end periods where there are unexecuted market orders on the order book after the 
uncrossing. Secondly, a Price Monitoring Extension (PME) can be activated where the 
indicative uncrossing price is at least 20% at variance with the final continuous session trade 
of the previous day. The MOE and PME can each only occur once for a trading session, thus 
all unexecuted orders after this point are retained on the order book for possible execution 
during the continuous trading phase. If the order book is not crossed for any instrument, the 
first automatic trade during the continuous trading session will be its opening price for 
trading on that day. 
 
The continuous trading period (NTH) is normally the longest period of the day and it 
concludes at 16:30:00 hrs. The period may be interrupted when an order executable at 5% or 
more below or above the last automatic trade is submitted. At that point, a five-minute call 
period AESP (Automatic Execution Suspension) plus a random 30-second end period is 
activated with the option of an MOE afterwards. Should the order book not be crossed, 
continuous trading will resume after the MOE, and the first automatic trade after the AESP 
will be the new reference price for the affected instrument. Traded volumes and prices in the 
last 10 minutes of the continuous trading period from 16:20:00hrs to 16:30:00hrs are used to 
compute the Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) for the day. In order to ensure that 
continuous trading runs during the last 10 minutes, AESPs cannot be activated after 
16:12:00hrs. Following the continuous trading session, an auction call period ensues for five 
minutes at 16:30:00hrs. During the closing auction, limit and market orders can be submitted. 
If buy and sell orders are crossed during this period, the uncrossing price is released to the 
market as the closing price, and the indicative price at which crossed orders are executed. If 
there are remaining unexecuted orders following the uncrossing, an MOE is activated. And if 
 the uncrossing price is at least 5% away from the VWAP (if there is no VWAP, then the last 
automatic trade), a PME is activated. Should the uncrossing price remain at least 5% away 
from the VWAP (or the last automatic trade) an Additional PME (APME) will be activated. 
The APME runs for 10 minutes plus a random 30-second end period. All these extensions can 
occur only once per closing of a trading day. If the closing procedure does not yield an 
indicative uncrossing price, then the last automatic trade during the trading day will be the 
closing price.
4
 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample Selection 
Our data is made up of 70 FTSE 100 stocks, which account for 91.23% of the index’s market 
capitalisation on 30
th
 September 2013. Please see Appendix A for the stocks and their 
corresponding FTSE composition. Combined, all FTSE 100 firms account for more than 81% 
of the total market capitalisation of the LSE listed firms, thus we assume that our results will 
be representative of the general market conditions on the LSE. We obtain two ultra-high 
frequency datasets from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database; these datasets are 
for stocks traded on the SETS segments SETS0 and SETS1. SETS0 and SETS1 segments 
contain the most liquid FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms. The datasets we obtained cover the 
253 LSE trading days between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013, which is also our 
sample period. The number of observations in the two datasets equal approximately 1.65 
billion observations including both quotes and transactions data, and all observations are time 
stamped to the nearest millisecond. Specifically, the following variables are included in the 
datasets: Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask 
price, bid volume and ask volume. All trades reported after 16:50:00hrs are excluded from 
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 See London Stock Exchange (2000a, 2000b, 2001 and 2013) for more details of the institutional framework. 
 the final sample because they are reported after the time a possible APME could have run 
each day as the APME can only run once as previously detailed. 
 
In the dataset, quotes account for a little over 1.498 billion (90.79%) of the observations.  
This means that quotes are updated regularly relative to trading or order submission 
frequency, and thus we can easily obtain the best prevailing bid and ask quotes for each trade. 
We first employ the quotes in determining the prevailing best bid and ask quotes, as well as 
quote midpoints for each transaction; thereafter the quote rows are eliminated from the 
dataset, thus leaving us with only the trades, totalling 150,660,824. Each of the trades have 
now been allocated corresponding prevailing best bid and ask quotes, and quote midpoints 
computed from the discarded quote rows. We observe a number of anomalous observations in 
the 150,660,824 trade observations that could only have been as a result of data input errors. 
Thus we proceed to clean up the dataset by removing all observations with any evidence of 
data input errors as well as all non-FTSE 100 stocks; specifically we delete all observations 
satisfying any of the following criteria: 
 
1. Transaction price during the NTH is greater than the prevailing best ask price; 
2. The quoted bid price exceeds the quoted ask price; 
3. The quoted bid-ask spread, defined as the difference between the ask and the bid 
price, exceeds £4; 
4. The value of the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the transaction price is greater than 
0.35;
5
 
5. Any of the following variables is missing for that observation: price, volume, quoted 
bid and ask prices; 
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 Conditions 3 and 4 are inspired by Chordia et al. (2001); given the improved levels of trading frequency, the 
conditions stipulated in the earlier paper are adjusted for higher trading frequency. 
 6. Non-FTSE 100 stock transaction; 
7. Transaction is for FTSE 100 stock added to or removed from the index between the 
period 30
th
 September 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013.  
 
These conditions yield in a final combined dataset with 73,616,187 transactions for 70 FTSE 
100 stocks trading over the sample period. The 70 stocks account for 91.23% of the total 
FTSE 100 market capitalisation on 30
th
 September, 2013, the last date in our sample. To the 
best of our knowledge, this sample size surpasses any volume of observations employed in 
any prior study of the microstructure of the LSE. The sample period is also more recent, by 
more than a decade, than any used in an existing study. 
 
3.2. Sample Description 
The combined FTSE 100 stocks in the sample averages a total trading value of over £21.54 
billion per day from a daily average of 290,973 transactions. The total traded value over the 
253 trading day-period is about £5.45 ($8.96) trillion. Table 1 shows the summary statistics 
for the sample used in this paper. Panel A presents a trade-based summary, while Panel B 
shows daily averages of transaction volumes. In both panels, we rank the sample stocks into 
quintiles on the basis of transaction volumes for the sample period. Quintile 5 contains the 14 
highest trading stocks by daily pound value, and Quintile 1 contains the 14 least trading 
stocks by daily pound value. The panels are divided into three main time periods for each 
quintile: Pre-open (07:10:00hrs - call end), NTH (08:00:30hrs - 16:30:00hrs) and Post-NTH 
(16:30:01hrs - 16:50:00hrs). Pre-open is also further divided into Pre-opening call auction 
(07:10:00hrs - 07:50:00hrs) and the Opening auction (07:50:01hrs - call end). Post-NTH 
includes the Closing auction (16:30:01hrs - 16:38:00hrs) and the Post-close (16:38:01hrs -
16:50:00hrs). 
  
In this section, most of the focus will be on the daily averages presented in Panel B. The 
highest grossing stocks have the highest number of transactions and pound value per day. The 
combined daily number of transactions (pound value) for the highest trading stocks is about 
six (207.33) times greater than the total for the lowest trading stocks. Also, most of the daily 
transactions occur during the NTH; almost 98% (284,548) of all transactions are recorded for 
the NTH. However, the trend is very different when one considers the value of those 
transactions; on an average day, the NTH accounts for only about 13.89% (£2.99 billion) of 
total traded value, while the post-NTH accounts for 84.86% (£18.28 billion). This is quite an 
interesting yet consistent occurrence for nearly every day in the sample. A closer analysis 
shows that the unusual phenomenon occurs only for the highest trading stocks grouped into 
Quintile 5; for the other four quintiles, the NTH easily accounts for 73.81% (£1.27 billion) of 
daily average traded value, while post-NTH only accounts for 23.04% (£395.48 million) of 
the daily average of traded value. Further, we find that the trades responsible for the massive 
values traded during the post-NTH period usually occur post-close and are off-floor dealer 
trades reported on the LSE. Since the large Quintile 5 post-NTH trades are off-floor broker-
dealer trades, they are likely to be upstairs trades registered on SETS after the close (during 
and after closing auction). They are also likely to be institutional trades pre-agreed with 
dealers to execute at the closing price (see Friederich and Payne, 2007). We observe that they 
usually result in large price movements relative to other trades. Of course this could be 
because of microstructure impacts due to their sizes. It is on the basis of this interesting 
impact that we extend the trading time of interest to 16:50:00hrs so we could capture their 
after hours effects. Their impact can however be isolated since our analytical approach is 
mainly based on estimating values within time-specific intervals.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 While the post-NTH period is a relatively active interval of the day for all the quintiles with 
even the first quintile averaging nearly 600 transactions per day, the pre-open is only 
significantly active for the highest volume quintile. However, pre-open trades are on average 
larger than trades during any other phase of the trading day, and this is confirmed in Panel A 
of Table 1. The mean for trades occurring in the first period is higher than other periods for 
four of the five quintiles, the only exception being the largest volume quintile where the post-
NTH has a larger size per trade. Given the propensity of large trades to elicit microstructure 
impacts and because the period, with the exception of the largest volume stocks, is 
characterised by thin trading, we expect the pre-open to be noisier for lower volume stocks 
than the other periods of the day. Literature suggests that trading activity enhances price 
discovery, thus when trading is thin, the price discovery process is less efficient. Although we 
also note that quotes are frequently posted and updated by market makers during the 10-
minute auction period and prior to the auction period proper. Thus the level of market support 
available during the period prior to the NTH is not significantly less than during the NTH, 
and this may help to improve the price discovery process prior to the NTH. The question of 
whether posting of quotes can help improve price discovery is also dependent on the quote 
spreads. If the market makers are cautious, the posting and updating of quotes may not do 
much to help since the spreads will be wide in order to reflect adverse selection costs. We 
consider this issue in subsequent sections.         
 
3.3. Trading Activity on the LSE 
Figure 1 shows the daily volume per minute for the five quintiles; the logs of the values are 
plotted given the high variability in volume differences among the three trading periods. 
During the pre-open and prior to the call auction period, some trading is registered. However, 
as shown earlier in Table 1, these trades are few, leading to a slow start to the pre-open. This 
 is consistent for all five quintiles, with all categories showing evidence of high variation in 
average trading values per minute prior to the opening call auction. For example, in the first 
minute of the pre-open included in the sample (07:16:00hrs), the average trading volume for 
all quintiles is about £33.65 million, this falls some 99.86% to approximately £48,714 at 
07:50:00hrs, just microseconds before the call auction period. The average daily trading 
volume then rises sharply to more than £173.33 million for the entire call auction from 
07:50:00 - 08:00:00hrs. The final 50-odd seconds of the opening call auction itself accounts 
for approximately 58.41% of the call auction period trading value as most of the orders are 
entered just before the auction algorithm runs.
6
 The vast majority of trades during the 
opening call auction are for the highest volume stocks. Although, with the exception of the 
minute ending 16:35:00hrs when the closing auction algorithm usually runs, 08:00:00hrs has 
the highest trading value, the number of trades for the minute is very small in comparison to 
the rest of the trading day minutes. Microstructure literature suggests that large trades are 
naturally more informative than medium and small trades, thus we expect that trades at 
08:00hrs, and during other minutes of the entire pre-open, will be more informative than 
trades at any point during the NTH or post-NTH. We test this hypothesis in Section 4.2.2. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The trading value is sustained at over £170 million only on account of a steep increase in the 
value of lower volume stocks traded within the first 10 minutes of the NTH following their 
failure at the opening call auction. The lower volume stocks seem to have settled for a de-
facto price referencing period between 08:00:00 - 08:10:00hrs because the trading value for 
Quintiles 4 to 1 then rise relative to the Quintile 5 levels during this period. To underscore 
this evolution, the trading value of the four lower quintiles combined approaches 45.14% of 
Quintile 5 trading value for the period. This is the highest level relative to Quintile 5 stocks, 
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 We find that some dealer trades are also registered on SETS during this period. 
 which the combined lower quintile stocks attain at any point during a typical trading day.
7
 
Afterwards, and for the rest of the day, the trading value settles down to a relatively 
stationary value, starting at approximately £2.87 million for the minute ending 08:11hrs, 
throughout the trading day, and prior to the closing call auction. Figure 1 shows a slight 
evidence of the characteristic U-shape reported by several studies such as Barclay and 
Hendershott (2003) and Chan et al. (1995). 
 
Although there are far fewer trades per minute in both the pre-open and post-NTH than there 
are in the NTH, their sizes are larger. In Figures 2 and 3, we show the mean and median trade 
sizes per minute for each quintile.  Due to the large differences between the trade sizes in the 
three periods, we plot the logarithmic values of the mean and median rather than the raw 
values. With the exception of Quintile 5, the mean trade sizes are stationary once the market 
opens. The median values however are better behaved, with all the quintiles in sync.  This is 
because the median is less affected by extreme trade sizes executed off the floor through the 
broker-dealer channels. However, both measures tell the same story. 08:01:00hrs has the 
highest mean trade size for the entire NTH at £157,872.44 however this is only 0.85% 
(0.87%) of the average trade size at 07:16:00hrs (16:34:00hrs). These comparisons evidence 
the extent of variability in trade sizes during the different trading periods. With such large 
variations, we also expect dramatic variations in the identity of dominant market participants 
during the different trading periods. Microstructure literature shows that with the large 
average trade sizes in the pre-open and post-NTH, one should expect to find more informed 
trades being executed, thus those periods will have more active informed and sophisticated 
traders. We test this hypothesis in Section 4.3. 
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 Ellul et al. (2005) already report on the case of failure to open at the call. Their analysis shows that the call is 
not optimal for medium and small cap stocks. In this paper, we provide microstructure evidence that suggests 
this is a function of trading activity rather than market capitalisation. Further evidence provided in successive 
sections will explore this phenomenon further and provide more insight. 
 INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Price Discovery on the London Stock Exchange 
The variation of trading activity across the trading day also has implications for the evolution 
of price discovery. According to the literature (see for example Chordia et al., 2011; Barclay 
et al., 1990), trading activity is inextricably linked to the price formation process. Since our 
main interest in this paper is to examine the efficiency of incorporating information in the 
prices of stocks around the open and close, i.e. the informational efficiency of price 
discovery, we commence our analysis by examining the intraday price discovery process 
around those periods and throughout the entire trading day.   
  
4.1.1. Weighted Price Contribution 
We estimate the proportion of close-to-close price evolution discovered for different periods 
across the day starting with the first period when off floor trades are sent to SETS between 
07:10:00 and 07:20:00hrs. The periods for which we estimate the proportion of close-to-close 
price discovery includes the first 10 and the final five 10-minute periods across the trading 
periods as well as the block of trading hours between 09:00:00 - 16:00:00hrs. Since we 
measure period by period price discovery, we use the well-established weighted price 
contribution (WPC) (see Barclay and Warner, 1993; Barclay et al., 1990; Cao et al., 2000; 
Barclay and Hendershott, 2004; van Bommel, 2011).
8
 
 
For each trading session/day and period k, we define the WPC as: 
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 van Bommel (2011) show that the WPC is consistent; it is also the only unbiased and asymptotically normal 
measure for price discovery if the price process follows is a driftless martingale. 
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rets corresponds to the close-to-close return for stock s and skret , is the logarithmic return for 
period k and for stock s. In Equation (1), 
s
sk
ret
ret ,
 is a measure of relative proportion of the 
day’s return given by stock s; 
 
S
s s
s
ret
ret
1
, which is the standardised absolute value of sret , is 
the weighing factor for each stock. With the introduction of a weighing factor, smaller sret  
are thus given small weights. The WPC is normally computed on a stock-by-stock basis and 
then averaged out across the stocks (see Cao et al., 2000). For this procedure however, stock 
correlations, due to the common constituents, complicates statistical inferences about the 
mean. In our sample, we compute the WPC for each stock and obtain average cross-
sectionally across stocks and also compute WPCs for each day and average across days; 
however similarly to Barclay and Hendershott (2003), we only notice slight qualitative 
differences. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we obtain the mean WPC for each day, 
and employ the time series standard error of the daily WPCs for statistical inference. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 presents the WPCs for five quintiles and all the stocks combined; the results for each 
category of stocks are for 10-minute periods from 07:10:00 - 09:00:00hrs and 16:00:01-
16:50:00hrs, as well as for the NTH period between 09:00:01 and 16:00:00hrs. There are four 
striking results emerging from this analysis. The first is the huge disparity in the proportion of 
price discovery recorded during the opening call auction period for Quintile 5
9
 stocks on one 
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 There are a few Quintile 5 stocks (e.g. BAES, BLT and RIO) that suffer failure at the open call auction or post 
no trades/auction orders during the call auction; they are excluded from aggregate WPC of Quintile 5 stocks as 
 hand, and the lower quintile stocks on the other. So striking is the difference that none of the 
lower quintile stock WPCs during the opening call auction are significantly different from 
zero. This clearly illustrates the general lack of informativeness of dealer transactions 
favoured by the lower quintile stocks during the call auction period. It further suggests that 
platform/floor orders/trades are still primarily the drivers of opening price change on the 
LSE; this much is underscored by the general lack of statistical significance for the pre-call 
period WPCs as well.
10
 Second, approximately 30% or more of the close-to-close price 
discovery occurs during the call auction (08:00:00 - 08:10:00hrs) period for Quintile 5 (other 
quintiles) stocks. This shows that information accumulated overnight is incorporated into 
stock prices during the call auction for high volume stocks and within the first few minutes of 
the NTH for other stocks. It is tenable to expect that firm-relevant information is accumulated 
overnight since firms routinely time the releasing of their earnings and other reports for the 
post-NTH; further these releases have been shown to impact trading during afterhours trading 
sessions (see for example Jiang et al., 2012). Further, price innovation in the early trading 
could have been influenced by activities from dealer activity. Thus for stocks that are not 
extensively traded/reported post-NTH, the first opportunity to incorporate new information 
will be during the first minutes of NTH or the pre-open. The puzzling aspect however is that 
the early broker-dealer trades do not reflect all of the overnight information. Indeed price 
discovery does not really start until the call auction period at 07:50:00hrs; even then it only 
starts for the highest volume stocks and not the lower volume ones, their price discovery only 
start when the market opens at 08:00:01 hrs. This leads to the third striking aspect of the 
results. More than 50% of price discovery occurs before 09:00:01hrs in the morning for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
well as further analyses of the 10-minute opening call auction period in order to ensure comparability of 
samples.    
10
 The statistical significance and value of these estimates are at variance with those obtained by Ellul et al. 
(2005). While we do not postulate as to the reasons why, we expect that this difference is related to the fact that 
our sample is more recent by more than 13 years than Ellul et al.’s (2005) and the market has evolved over time. 
However, we note that our results are more in line with the observation of Friederich and Payne (2007) that the 
opening auction on the LSE hardly succeeds; their data is slightly more recent than Ellul et al.’s (2005). 
 lower quintile stocks. And if one considers the call auction period as well, then the same 
phenomenon is true for the highest volume quintile. Thus information is only normally 
incorporated into stock prices in small drips after the heavy absorption of information into 
stock prices in the morning. Finally, the fourth main observation from Table 2 involves the 
dramatic correction of prices recorded once the market closes. It does appear that the closing 
auction and the broker-dealer trades after the continuous trading session/NTH provide the 
opportunity for traders to revise downwards their valuation of stocks, especially for the 
higher volume quintile stocks. 
 
The results obtained here are consistent with the conclusions from after hours trading analysis 
of NASDAQ stocks by Barclay and Hendershott (2003). Since the high volume stocks have a 
greater percentage, than other stocks, of their total daily trading in the pre-open (see Table 1), 
a large proportion of price discovery thus shifts to the pre-open, specifically to the opening 
call auction period. Thus, the question of why there is a high level of failure to open at the 
opening call for lower volume stocks is not only related to traders making a decision based on 
transaction costs; it may also be a question of the non-execution of trades. With lower trading 
volumes (including dealership trades), such as an average of 7.60 trades in the pre-open per 
day for Quintile 1 stocks, finding counterparty to trade with must be difficult; Ellul et al. 
(2005) make this argument by proposing the coordination theory as an explanation of low 
volume stocks traders’ behaviour, by avoiding the call auction.  However, it is perhaps 
possible to encourage low volume stock traders to use the opening call auction if a slight 
adjustment could be made to the call auction algorithm. At present, the algorithm is tailored 
to maximise volumes rather than executing at the best ask/bid prices; assuming the algorithm 
prioritises prices, with necessary circuit breakers, rather than volume. For example, a volume 
weighted price during the call auction will ensure that low volume stock trades stand a better 
 probability of execution. Low volume stock traders could then place market orders with a 
higher expectation of execution. The changes made to SETS regarding the introduction of the 
opening and closing call auction, at present only works for a fraction of the stocks traded on 
the LSE.        
 
4.2. Price Discovery and Informational Efficiency 
4.2.1. Unbiasedness Regressions 
The WPCs indicate that approximately 30% or more of the close-to-close price discovery 
occurs during the call auction (08:00:00 - 08:10:00hrs) period for Quintile 5 (other quintiles) 
stocks. It is assumed that these respective periods set the pace for price discovery throughout 
the NTH and beyond, since they are the most informative intervals during the entire trading 
periods. Considering how important it is that the prices revealed during these periods be 
informationally efficient, we proceed to measure their informational efficiency by employing 
what Biais et al. (1999) call ‘unbiasedness regressions’ despite  their slopes having a natural 
interpretation that encapsulates the degree of noise during an estimated period. We examine 
efficiency of the price discovery process due to the significance of the opening price for 
investors. This is vital when one considers that a market’s informational efficiency is a 
critical requirement for investor participation in markets. 
 
In order to compute the level of price efficiency for specified periods, for each stock and each 
day, Equation (2) is estimated separately for each time period; where ccret  is the close to 
close return and ckret  is the return from the close to the end time of period k:  
 
ckckcc retret                                                                                                              (2) 
 According to Barclay and Hendershott (2003), the slope coefficient β measures the ratio of 
signal to the noise. Consider the standard errors-in-variables problem a la regression analysis; 
if we assume no errors in the stock returns computation as well as no correlations, the slope 
coefficient in (2) will be equal to one. Further, if we assume that the actual return is not 
observable since the observable return is a combination of the real return plus some noise 
element. Noise may include microstructure effects such as spread components or reversible 
price impacts. Thus we will observe vRETret cccc    and uRETret ckck   and we assume 
that ccRET  and ckRET  are the actual returns, and v and u have zero mean and respective 
variances equivalent to 
2
v  and
2
u . An ordinary least squares estimation of Equation (2) will 
yield an estimated slope coefficient *, where  
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ckRET
2  encapsulates the total observable information from the previous close to the time 
period k and  is the noise effect in prices at period k. The slope therefore is a measure of 
the ratio of information content (signal) to signal plus noise in prices at period k. Therefore, 
the extent to which the slope is less than unity is the extent of noisiness in period k, since if 
there is no noise element the slope will yield one. Equation (2) is estimated for each stock and 
each period k. From these regressions, we obtain the slope coefficient estimates for each 
stock and in turn compute the mean stock slope for each time period. We also follow Biais et 
al. (1999) to compute the confidence bands by using the time series’ standard errors of the 
mean of the slope coefficient estimates. The mean coefficient and estimates along with the 
confidence bands are charted in Figure 4a - 4e. As pointed out by Biais et al. (1999), the time 
series estimation of stock returns in the presence of learning is problematic as a result of non-
stationarity, which can be induced by non-stationarity. In order to avoid the spurious 



 u
2
 regression problem, we examine each time series for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test; and the obtained results suggest that the variables are stationary. We also ensure 
that we obtain robust standard errors by applying the Newey and West (1987) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance (HAC) matrix estimator, which 
is consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. 
The results obtained from the HAC estimation are not materially different from those 
obtained for the regressions using only OLS.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Given the variation in the onset of price discovery for the highest volume and lower volume 
stocks, it is important that we present the charts for the mean coefficients individually for the 
quintiles. The charts for the lower volume quintiles are quite consistent; however, as expected 
Quintile 5’s chart looks slightly different. For the highest volume stocks (Quintile 5), the 
informational efficiency of stock prices is low prior to the call auction period when only 
broker-dealer trades are submitted. During the call auction interval, a dramatic rise in the 
mean coefficients is registered; the mean estimate increases nearly five times to 0.83 from 
0.17 during the 10-minute interval ending 08:00:00hrs. And within 10 minutes later at 
08:10:00hrs, the mean coefficient has risen to 0.97; this level of price efficiency is thereafter 
largely maintained until about 09:00:00hrs. The informational efficiency of the stock prices 
remains high, above 0.84, for the rest of the trading day even after the market has closed. The 
evolution of the price discovery efficiency as shown in Figure 4 does suggest that the call 
auction price discovery is informationally efficient for the highest volume stocks. However, 
for lower volume stocks, which experience failure to open at the call auction, the mean 
coefficients at 08:00:00 hrs are very low. The highest at 08:00:00hrs is for Quintile 2 at 0.23. 
Thereafter however, once the continuous order-driven trading period gets under way, the 
 mean coefficient estimates for all the lower volume stocks rise dramatically, as well in a 
fashion similar to Quintile 5’s rising, during the call auction. These results are at variance 
with Barclay and Hendershott (2003) who report high informational efficiency in the pre-
open for all stocks in their sample, although they fail to make distinctions on the basis of 
trading activity. Our results are however similar to Biais et al.’s (1999) findings. We put this 
disparity in results down to trading activity. Biais et al.’s (1999) results are based on an 
analysis of a market, the Paris Bourse, where no actual trading occurs during the pre-open, 
while Barclay and Hendershott’s (2003) results are based on a sample of NASDAQ stocks 
traded in the pre-open with a relatively higher number of transactions than in our sample. 
Also in our analysis, we further divide the pre-open into five intervals before conducting our 
analysis, thereby yielding a reduced average number of transactions for each interval. Thus, 
the results in this section further cement the prior literature findings that trading activity is a 
critical part of the price discovery process and its efficiency. The opening and closing call 
auctions are both informationally efficient for the highest volume stocks because of their 
adequately high level of trading activity. As shown in Table 1, the lower volume stocks also 
have appreciable levels of trading activities in the post-NTH, therefore their informational 
efficiency is largely sustained even after the market has closed, and the transaction numbers 
have dropped sharply. We therefore propose that if measures are introduced to increase the 
trading activity in the opening call for lower volume stocks, the pricing efficiency of stocks 
during the call auction will increase and more price discovery will shift to the opening call. 
          
4.2.2. Weighted Price Contribution per Trade (WPCT) 
The high level of price efficiency recorded for the opening call auction (10-minute period 
ending 08:10:00hrs) for Quintile 5 stocks (other quintiles) and the high WPCs for those 
periods when considered, along with the relatively low number of transactions, suggest that 
 individual trades reveal more information for all stocks in the pre-open than during the NTH. 
Lower volume stocks trades during the first 10 minutes of the NTH are also expected to 
reveal more information than the rest of the NTH. We examine this by constructing the 
weighted price contribution per trade (WPCT), which measures the amount of price return 
observed for each of those intervals. The WPCT is computed by dividing the WPC per 
trading interval by the weighted ratio of trades executed during that period (interval). If for 
each day, tk,s is the number of executed trades in time period k for contract s, and ts  is the 
total sum of tk,s  for all the periods, then WPCTk is defined as: 
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Since the WPCT refers to the ratio of the aggregate price shift occurring in a period scaled by 
the ratio of trades in that same period, the measure should equal approximately one if all the 
trades contain similar information levels. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 reports the results for the WPCT analysis. As hypothesised, trades in the pre-open are 
very informative and are all highly statistically significant. Given that most of the price 
discovery per minute occurs between 08:00:00 and 08:10:00hrs for the lower quintile stocks, 
WPCTs are also high and statistically significant for that period and for those stocks. 
Generally the WPCTs are very high, and somewhat noisy given the low trading levels, prior 
to the open.  Thereafter they decline as the NTH commences. This shows that the 
 informativeness of individual transactions has dwindled, and that during the NTH one trade 
hardly moves prices in a significant manner; i.e. price movements are likely to occur on 
account of order flow rather than just a trade (see for example Chordia et al., 2008). The 
results in this section are further confirmation that the market is more efficient during the 
NTH than other trading periods, since it is unlikely that one trade’s information content will 
be large enough to cause a significant shift in price. Also, the trades have become less 
disproportionately informative as they seem to be during the pre-open. Further, the results 
here considered in tandem with the increasing liquidity evidenced in the spread analysis 
shown in Figures 5a and 5b, suggest that as the market progresses from the opening call 
auction period towards the NTH the stock prices, especially for large volume stocks, become 
more efficient.   
 
We contend that the improvement in stock price efficiency in the case of Quintile 5 stocks 
during the opening call is a function of the informativeness of the transactions. As the day 
progresses, trades become less informative after the information accumulated the previous 
day’s close has been incorporated in the early trading, starting with the opening call auction 
for the Quintile 5 stocks. Had the lower quintile stocks been able to muster trading depth 
during the call, their price discovery would have commenced earlier, at the open call auction, 
as well. However, given a fear of lack of counterparty to fill orders, many lower volume 
stock traders opt to either hold off trading until the floor opens at 08:00:00hrs or trade 
through the broker-dealer route. Trading activity evidence suggests that the majority of this 
class of traders do the former. Thus, based on the data in our sample, lower volume stock 
traders are not really choosing between the broker-dealer route and the call auction as 
suggested by Ellul et al. (2005), rather they are largely withholding trades until the market 
opens, where they are more likely to have their orders filled, or perhaps to avoid trading in an 
 environment dominated by informed traders. Since lower volume stock traders are likely to 
be largely uninformed or noise traders, they will normally avoid trading with informed 
traders or seek a premium for doing so. This view is underscored by resent theoretical 
evidence presented by Malinova and Park (2014). They show that in a dynamic market where 
several heterogeneously informed traders choose to place orders, better informed traders trade 
immediately, while worse informed traders delay even when they know that the market could 
move against them. We therefore suggest that small volume stock traders avoid trading 
during the call auction because of the dominant presence of informed traders, thereby leading 
to the failure of lower volume stocks at the opening call auction. In Section 4.3, we examine 
the evolution of informed trading/information asymmetry across the different trading periods. 
If the opening call period has higher adverse selection costs than other trading periods, this 
will support our hypothesis. Based on the evolution of the spread estimates in Figure 5, we 
expect higher level of informed trading during the opening call auction period. The pre-open 
and post-NTH spreads are generally wider than the NTH. Even surprising is the sustained 
widening of spreads during the opening call auction period for mainly the highest volume 
stocks. For example, the bid-ask (effective) spread increases more than 43 (17) times at the 
opening call auction start (07:51:00hrs) from the previous minute. This unexpected evolution 
however resonates with the relative and uneven informativeness of the high volume stock 
trades during the entire pre-open period. Curiously, the relative informativeness of the 
opening call auction trades help in raising the level of price efficiency despite their widening 
of the spreads because they are information-driven trades.  Thus the new prices they reveal 
are unlikely to be reversed in the short term. The spreads are therefore wider during the 
opening call auction period because market makers recognise the impact of the auction 
transactions and respond accordingly. The informativeness of the transactions is evidenced 
further by the rapid improvement in price efficiency starting at 07:51:00hrs. 
 INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE     
4.3. Modelling Adverse Selection Costs 
4.3.1. Adverse Selection Costs by Trading Pressure 
We now return to the question of the type of traders dominating trades at specific intervals 
during the trading day. As stated in the preceding section, low volume stock traders are likely 
to avoid trading in an environment dominated by informed traders. Trading periods 
dominated by informed traders are characterised by higher adverse selection costs. The type 
of traders who dominate different periods during the trading day will also directly influence 
the price discovery process and its efficiency. Given the variation in the various spread 
measures obtained across the day (see Figure 5), there is ample reason to expect that the 
composition of traders evolves quite dramatically from period to period. Since the spreads are 
higher in the pre-open and post-NTH, we expect the trades during those periods to be of the 
informed variety. Thus the spreads widen to accommodate increasing market makers’ adverse 
selection costs in addition to relatively stationary inventory and transaction costs. 
 
We estimate the adverse selection costs using the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread 
decomposition model; we expect this to give us an indication of the type of traders 
dominating different points across the trading day. This approach employs the fact that quote 
shifts due to inventory costs do not arise from inventory alterations in just one stock, i.e. the 
instrument of interest, but from other stocks held in a given portfolio of stocks.
11
 This is thus 
a portfolio approach to decomposing the spread, it is based on the assumption that adverse 
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 Consider a liquidity supplier purchasing stock x at the bid quote. The trade will lower the bid and offer prices 
of the stock as well as for other correlated stocks. The opposite of this trade is a sale in the correlated stocks; this 
hedges his position in stock x. In reverse, if we assume that the other stocks are constrained by trading pressure, 
the liquidity supplier may choose not to induce lowering of the quoted prices for x if his aim is to hedge his 
buying of other stocks thus spurring sales in x. This approach recognises that there is a probability that x’s 
quotes are driven by more than just inventory impacts and the information components of only x. Specifically, 
trading pressure on account of other stocks should result in alterations in quotes of x due to the efforts of 
liquidity suppliers to retain the balance of their portfolios. 
 information relates to instruments on individual basis, yet inventory impacts are portfolio 
wide. In employing this approach, we assume, similarly to Heflin and Shaw (2000), that 
‘liquidity suppliers’/market makers take the opposite of all executed trades or submitted call 
auction orders, which are then executed when the call algorithm runs. Liquidity providers 
may not be interpreted strictly as market makers submitting all orders or executing all the 
trades, but also as sophisticated traders watching more than just one stock at a time. This is 
tenable since liquidity may be defined as the availability of counterparties to trade with. 
Indeed Huang and Stoll (1997) propose a refinement of their approach through the 
nomination of specific portfolios other than purely a market maker’s. An example of such a 
portfolio is an index portfolio such as the FTSE 100, which we employ in this paper. 
  
4.3.2. A Trade Indicator Model 
Assuming that there are no transaction costs;  the hidden core value of a stock is 
established just before the bid, and offer quotes are published at time t. Quote mid-price is 
denoted as Mt  will only be computed as the quotes are released. Let trade price at time t be Pt 
and  be the purchase/sale indicator variable for the trade price, Pt.  equals +1 if the trade 
is initiated by the buyer and also executes at a price higher than the mid-price, -1 if the trade 
is seller initiated and also executes below the mid-price and finally  takes the value of 0 if 
the trade executes at the mid-price. The hidden  is modelled as below: 
                                                                                                         (5) 
S corresponds to the constant spread, α is the percentage of half-spread due to adverse 
selection costs, while  represents the serially uncorrelated public information shock. The 
Equation (5) decomposes transaction costs, Vt into two elements. The first is the private 
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 information element uncovered from the previous trade, 12  t
S Q   (see Copeland and Galai, 
1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). And second, public information element encapsulated by 
εt. Although, transaction cost Vt is purely theoretical, the midpoint, Mt of the spread is 
observable. Liquidity suppliers aim to achieve inventory equilibrium therefore effect 
equilibrium-inducing transactions by modifying quotes (hence mid-price). The adjustments 
are carried out in relation to the core value stocks as is informed by inventory levels (see for 
example Ho and Stoll, 1981; Stoll, 1978). Suppose that previous transactions are of a normal 
size of one, the midpoint (mid-price) in relation to the core stock value then correspond to: 
                                                                                                             (6) 
β corresponds to the magnitude of the half-spread measure due to inventory costs, where 
 is the aggregate inventory from when the market opens to time t-1, and  is the 
inceptive inventory for that trading day. If there are no inventory holding costs, the ratio of 
 to  will be one. Equation (6) holds for bid, offer and mid-prices since it is already 
assumed that the spread is constant. 
First differencing of Equations (6) and (5) suggests that quotes are generally modified to 
show inventory costs and information exposed by the last transaction. Specifically, we have: 
                                                                                                    (7) 
with ∆ as the first difference operator. 
Equation (8) cites the assumption of a constant spread: 
                                                                                                               (8) 
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 Where  is the error term, and it encapsulates the deviation of the observable half-spread,
 from the constant half-spread, , with the inclusion of price discreteness-induced 
rounding errors. The estimable traded spread, S is distinguishable from the observable spread, 
St, because it is representative of trades outside the midpoint but within the spread. 
Transactions within the quoted spread and executed above the midpoint are regarded as ask 
transactions, and trades within the spread and executed below the midpoint are the bid trades. 
When S is estimated, it will be larger than the effective spread, which is the absolute value of 
transaction price minus the prevailing midpoint, . This is due to the exclusion of 
midpoint trades  from the estimation. In contradiction to this, the unobserved 
estimated spread S, obtained from serial covariance of transaction prices (see Roll, 1984) are 
swayed by volume of midpoint transactions. Harris (1990) however suggests that the Roll 
(1984) spread estimator may be significantly biased. 
When Equations (7) and (8) are integrated, the basic regression Model (9) is produced: 
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whereby   and ttte , . The regression Model (9) is a nonlinear indicator 
variable model with within-equation restrictions. The requirement for estimation is the 
indication of whether the transactions at t and t-1 execute at any of ask, bid or mid prices. The 
model estimation yields the traded spread, S, and the aggregate modification of quotes to 
transactions, )2/(S . The estimation Equation (9) does not yield independent estimates of 
adverse selection component, α and the inventory holding component, . Nevertheless, the 
proportion of the half-spread, which is not attributable to adverse information or inventory 
holding, can be estimated as 1 . This is the order processing costs estimate. 
t
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 Equation (9) does not consider the effects of normal trading pressure because the inventory 
modification earlier modelled in Equation (6) is based on the individual stock inventory held. 
The next step therefore is to differentiate buys and sells for each stock in a pool. If k 
corresponds to stock k, Equation (6) then becomes: 




1
1
2,,
,
t
t
Ai
S
ktktk QVM
k                                                                                                       (10) 
where  corresponds to the aggregate buy-sell indicator variable defined as follows: 
,                                                                                                (11) 
and n equals the number of FTSE 100 stocks that liquidity providers review to determine the 
mood of the market. Equation (10) can be written as   
                                                                    (12) 
Equation (12) remains an indicator variable model; in the absence of portfolio trading effects 
and frictions, it reverts to Equation (5). A key distinction however is that with Equation (12) 
all spread components of the bid-ask spreads can be estimated individually.
12
  
Equation (12) can also be expressed as:  
,1,,31,,2,,1, ttAktkktkktk eQQQP   ,                                                                           (13) 
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 This approach is also related to the Ho and Stoll (1983) model that shows the connection between quote 
adjustments in a stock and inventory changes in others. They show that the quote shifts in stock a in reaction to 
a trade in another stock b is dependent on cov(Ra, Rb)/σ
2
(Rb). 
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 where  is the change in price from the previous retained trade,  is equal to 1 (-1) 
when the transaction at period t for stock k is a market maker sell (buy) and  is the 
aggregate buy-sell indicator variable used in encapsulating portfolio trading pressure on 
market makers’ inventory levels, it is measured as in (11). The original datasets do not 
include information on trade direction, we therefore employ Lee and Ready’s (1991) 
algorithm to determine the direction of trade. Specifically, we classify trades at a price above 
the prevailing quote midpoint, as market maker sells and those at a price lower than the 
prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys. If the current and the previous trades are the 
same price, we classify using the next previous trade. This algorithm is established in 
microstructure literature. Further, independent analysis by Aitken and Frino (1996) supports 
Lee and Ready’s (1991) suggestion that the algorithm’s accuracy exceeds 90%. The adverse 
selection spread component, and the half spread, are thus computed by estimating Equation 
(13) using LS as adopted by Heflin and Shaw (2000); the estimate is one-half the 
estimated effective spread, and the adverse selection component is equivalent to )(2 ,1,2 kk 
.
13
  This approach is established in the literature, (see Van Ness et al., 2001; Heflin and Shaw, 
2000). Van Ness et al. (2001) even suggest that the Huang and Stoll (1997) approach is 
superior to other commonly used models in measuring adverse selection information costs. 
However, this seeming superiority comes at a cost. The possibility of obtaining implausible 
estimates from the model estimation when using the probability of trade reversal approach, 
rather than the trading pressure approach, has been reported. For example Clarke and Shastri 
(2000) report this problem in their analysis of 320 NYSE firms, Van Ness et al. (2001) also 
report similar issues. There seems to be a correlation between reduced probability of trade 
reversal and the implausible estimates. This paper reports only the trade aggregator 
                                                          
13
 Equation (13) can also be estimated using the GMM procedure with appropriate adjustments to the 
orthogonality conditions. The GMM levies relatively weak distributional requirements unlike maximum 
likelihood (see Madhavan et al., 1997; Huang and Stoll, 1997). In addition to following Heflin and Shaw’s 
(2000) estimation approach, we also estimate using the Newey and West (1987) HAC.   
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 estimation, and there is no suggestion that we are faced with this problem. Also it is 
necessary to align the trading times across all stocks involved in the estimation. This paper 
follows an approach described by Huang and Stoll (1997); specifically, we employ only the 
last trade at every five-minute interval in formulating our variables.
14
 Huang and Stoll (1997) 
stated that a cross-sectional estimation of Equation (13) is likely to lead to an overestimation 
of the adverse selection costs. We avoid this potential anomaly by adopting a time series 
estimation.
15
 Finally, we also use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for obtaining statistical 
inference on the level of differences between NTH intervals and the corresponding pre-open 
or post-NTH periods. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 presents the cross-sectional mean of the adverse selection costs by time period and 
pound volume quintile. The opening call auction adverse selection costs for lower volume 
stocks could not be obtained because of the very low number of trades over the sample 
period. Given that we could not robustly estimate their values with our chosen model, we 
report adverse selection costs for only the highest volume stocks.  The available results 
however support our hypothesis that the opening call auction period for the highest volume 
stocks has a significantly higher level of informed trading than other trading periods across 
the day. The results also confirm that informed trading is lowest during the NTH, while the 
pre-open and post-NTH periods generally have higher levels of informed trading across all 
                                                          
14
 Huang and Stoll (1997) observe that big orders are sometimes broken into smaller trades (see also Barclay 
and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001). To account for the associated problems arising from this practice, they 
devise a ‘bunching’ technique, such that trades executed at the same price, with same quotes and within five-
minute intervals of one another are bunched into one trade and treated as such. They however conclude that 
using one trade every five minutes greatly reduces any problem that may arise from breaking up large orders. 
Heflin and Shaw (2000) also adopt this approach. Moreover the results obtained by Huang and Stoll (1997) 
utilising the bunching technique suggest that the method unnecessarily increases the adverse selection 
component estimates. 
15
 We also employ panel GMM estimation, although this method led to the loss of many observations in order to 
ensure synchronity, the overall trend of the evolution of adverse selection costs is consistent with the time series 
averages.   
 quintiles. Adverse selection costs are lowest across the trading periods for Quintile 2 stocks; 
the pre-opening auction (closing auction) adverse selection costs is 14 (6) times the value for 
the NTH. Overall, there is higher level of informed trading recorded for the higher volume 
stocks during the pre-open and post-NTH, however during the NTH, the lowest volume 
stocks (Quintile 1) post the highest adverse selection costs. With these results, our 
expectation that the opening auction, and generally the pre-open, contain higher levels of 
informed trading is therefore confirmed. Thus our results contradict previous submissions in 
literature, which suggest that call auctions lead to lower information asymmetry (see for 
example Schnitzlein, 1996; Madhavan, 1992). Given, the significance of the results obtained, 
we propose that the lack of trading for lower volume stocks during the opening call auction is 
related to the significantly higher presence of informed traders during the period. This is 
further strengthened by the fact that for lower volume stocks, more dealer trades are recorded 
per minute for the 40-minute period prior to the opening call auction, than for the call auction 
period. This suggests that unless a more transparent opening call auction market is ensured, 
even when there is a higher level of potential counter parties for lower volume stock traders, 
they are unlikely to engage with the opening call auction.     
 
5. Conclusion 
The opening and closing prices are important reference points for investors and the general 
public. Opening prices may affect trader sentiment throughout the day, and opening/closing 
prices may be used to settle derivative contracts.  They are therefore of great 
importance.  Our results, however, suggest that the opening call auction often fails, and, on 
average, the pre-open incorporates little of the overnight information for low volume stocks. 
This may have repercussions for the value of investor portfolios - whether these portfolios are 
composed of the stock itself or a derivative of the stock- outside of this trading window. Thus 
 this paper conducts an ultrahigh frequency analysis of the opening and closing auction prices 
in a hybrid market - the LSE. We examine whether the opening and closing prices yielded by 
the call auction mechanism are informationally efficient. We find very large variability in our 
results with respect to trading volumes, such that higher volume stocks are more likely to be 
traded during the opening call auction than lower volume stocks. In fact lower volume stocks 
routinely fail at the opening call auction. Results suggest that this is due to both the 
unavailability of trading counterparties, as well as a conscious decision by lower volume 
stock traders to avoid the opening call auction given the domination of the period by 
informed traders. Although, Ellul et al. (2005) suggest that lower volume stock traders opt for 
the dealership during the opening call auction because of lack of trading partners, we find 
very little evidence to support this. Rather lower volume stock traders generally abstain from 
any form of trading during the 10-minute opening auction period. Thus, the price discovery 
process mainly commences for those stocks after the market opens, with more than 30% of 
the daily close-to-close price discovery occurring within the first 10 minutes of the market 
opening. For the higher volume stocks however, the highest rate of price discovery (31.8% 
over 10 minutes) occurs during the opening call auction period. Given the distribution of 
price discovery across the day, the opening call auction period (07:50:00-8:00:00hrs) London 
time yields a highly informationally efficient opening price for higher volume stocks, while 
an efficient price is not obtained for lower volume stocks until within the opening 10 minutes 
of the NTH. So inefficient is the price yielded during the call auction period for lower volume 
stocks, that price discovery efficiency is generally higher in the 30 minutes prior to the 
opening call auction period than during it.  
 
The closing price yielded by the closing call auction for all stocks is however better behaved 
and highly informationally efficient. This is because the NTH is a very efficient trading 
 period, thus providing a strong price discovery platform for the closing auction and the 
immediate market period afterwards (post-NTH). The results relating to the closing call 
auction are therefore consistent with previous literature on the issue (see for example 
Chelley-Steeley, 2008). However, having examined the LSE’s microstructure, we find no 
evidence that the closing call auction market quality characteristics impacts on the next day’s 
early trading as suggested by Chelley-Steeley (2009). If this were the case, price discovery 
and its efficiency would be high in the pre-open, especially for low volume stocks. Further, 
we document an interesting phenomenon, which runs contrary to Amihud et al.’s (1990) 
observation on the Milan exchange. We show that the call auction preceded by continuous 
trading leads to enhanced price discovery and efficiency for low volume stock rather than 
otherwise.         
 
Considered together, the results in this study suggest that the influence of the call auction for 
opening the market might have been exaggerated by previous literature (see Section 1) and 
oversold to investors by platforms eager to please the markets. According to Madhavan 
(1992), the advantage of a call auction comes from two offerings: transparency, because all 
orders are released to the market as at when placed, and higher liquidity, because all orders 
are in before auction. However, in an era where high frequency trading is increasingly pre-
eminent, this ‘advantage’ can no longer be considered as such, because higher volumes of 
trading are achieved during the NTH and the order book, on the LSE for example, is regularly 
updated in a fashion that allows for comparable transparency as during the call auction. Our 
results suggest that the LSE pre-open does not yield informationally efficient prices for low 
volume stocks, and that only high volume stocks benefit from price discovery efficiency 
during the opening call auction. We however believe that the opening call auction could be 
made more transparent and lower volume stock-friendly if the exchange de-emphasises 
 volume during the opening call. The call auction algorithm executes with the aim of 
maximising volume, and this means that trades may not be executed at the best possible 
prices from an uninformed trader’s point of view. We propose that the exchange prioritise 
prices instead, and aim for executing at a volume weighted price during the opening call 
auction, while moving all unexecuted orders on to the order book for trading during the NTH. 
The call auction algorithm should include appropriate circuit breakers. Should this not 
improve the situation, we have demonstrated ample evidence to suggest that doing away with 
the opening call auction altogether will not diminish the efficiency of the opening reference 
price. Therefore, markets should consider doing this after conducting appropriate simulation 
experiments. 
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 Figure 1: Daily Trading Volume per Minute for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The average pound daily volume is computed for each minute and for each quintile. The logs of the quintile values are graphed due to the large variability of trading volumes 
across different trading periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 
October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. 
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 Figure 2: Mean Trade Size per Minute across Quintiles 
The mean trade sizes per minute are computed for each quintile. The logs of the mean estimates are graphed due to the large variability of trading volumes across the three 
periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
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 Figure 3: Median Trade Size per Minute across Quintiles 
The median trade sizes per minute are computed for each quintile. The logs of the median estimates are graphed due to the large variability of trading volumes across the three 
periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
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 Figure 4 Informational Efficiency by Time periods 
The signal:noise ratio is computed for 10 minute intervals by regressing close-to-close return on the return from close to time period, k for FTSE 100 stocks trading between 1
st
 
October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. For each stock, the following equation is estimated separately for each time interval where 
  
retcc is the close-to-close return and 
  
retck is 
the return from the close to the end time of period k:  
  
retcc = a + bretck +ek 
Mean value of the coefficient estimates are obtained for each quintile in the sample and sub-figures A to E graph the informational efficiency as measured by the signa:noise ratio 
per interval for each of those five quintiles.  Confidence intervals are computed by employing the time series standard errors of the mean of the coefficient estimates. 
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 C: Quintile 3 Stocks 
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 D: Quintile 2 Stocks 
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 E: Quintile 1 Stocks (Lowest) 
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 Figure 5: Liquidity by Time Periods for FTSE 100 Stocks 
Liquidity proxies per minute are computed for FTSE 100 Stocks trading between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. Figure A shows the Quoted Bid-Ask spread, 
measured as the difference between the best ask and the best bid price, while Figure B shows the Effective Spread, measured as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the best trade price and prevailing midpoint per minute. The logs of the spread estimates are graphed because of the large variability of spreads across the trading 
periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
A: Quoted Bid-Ask Spread 
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 Table 1: Trading Summary Statistics for FTSE 100 Stocks 
Full and daily summary statistics for FTSE 100 stocks between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. Panel A shows the full statistics, whilst Panel B has the daily summary 
statistics.  
Panel A: Trade-Based Summary Statistics 
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Number of Transactions (‘000) Volume (£'000,000) Mean (£'000) 
Pre-
Open 
Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
Post-
NTH 
All 
Pre-
Open 
NTH Post-NTH All 
Pre-
Open 
NTH 
Post-
NTH 
All 
Lowest 1.92 4654.98 150.54 4807.44 625.89 18517.33 7143.64 26286.86 325.47 3.98 47.45 5.47 
2 2.88 7837.15 180.81 8020.83 1393.58 43959.05 14870.00 60222.63 484.39 5.61 82.24 7.51 
3 3.89 11413.85 213.31 11631.04 3510.60 78704.95 24486.01 106701.57 903.17 6.90 114.79 9.17 
4 4.99 21338.70 262.76 21606.45 8149.78 179357.73 53557.96 241065.46 1632.57 8.41 203.83 11.16 
Highest 114.26 26745.97 690.20 27550.43 54564.28 436277.91 4524868.09 5015710.29 477.55 16.31 6555.93 182.06 
Overall 127.94 71990.64 1497.61 73616.19 68244.13 756816.97 4624925.70 5449986.81 533.42 10.51 3088.21 74.03 
 
Panel B: Daily-Based Summary Statistics 
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Number of Transactions Volume (£'000,000) 
Pre-Open NTH Post-NTH All Pre-Open NTH Post-NTH All 
Lowest 7.60 18399.14 595.01 19001.75 2.47 73.19 28.24 103.90 
2 11.37 30976.87 714.65 31702.89 5.51 173.75 58.77 238.03 
3 15.36 45114.02 843.11 45972.49 13.88 311.09 96.78 421.75 
4 19.73 84342.67 1038.57 85400.97 32.21 708.92 211.69 952.83 
Highest 451.62 105715.30 2728.04 108894.96 215.67 1724.42 17884.85 19824.94 
Overall 505.68 284548 5919.39 290973.07 269.74 2991.37 18280.34 21541.45 
 Table 2: Price Discovery by Time Period for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The Weighted Price Contribution (WPC)  is computed by the pound volume quintile for FTSE 100 stocks. For each 
trading session/day and period k, we define the WPC as: 
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rets corresponds to the close-to-close return for stock s and retk,s is the log-return for period k and for stock s. The final 
row shows the fraction of days with their close-to-close return equalling 0. * indicates the WPCs, which are significantly 
different from 0 at 1% level. The data covers the trading period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. 
 
Time 
Periods 
  
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Highest 4th 3rd 2nd Lowest Overall 
Pre-
Open/Opening 
Auction 
  07:10 -
07:20 
0.009 0.086 0.041 -0.026 -0.024 0.017 
  07:20 - 
07:30 
0.029 -0.005 0.014 0.096 0.046 0.031 
  07:30 - 
07:40 
0.002 -0.013 0.016 -0.072 -0.005 -0.014 
  07:40 - 
07:50 
0.016 0.017 -0.012 0.006 0.011 0.007 
  07:50 - 
08:00 
0.318* 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.065 
Open-
Close/NTH 
  08:00 - 
08:10 
0.068* 0.286* 0.424* 0.369* 0.369* 0.303* 
  08:10 - 
08:20 
0.056* 0.076* 0.048* 0.069* 0.071* 0.064* 
  08:20 - 
08:30 
0.034* 0.021 0.037* 0.042* 0.033* 0.033* 
  08:30 - 
08:40 
0.054* 0.019 0.033* 0.047* 0.027* 0.036* 
  08:40 - 
08: 50 
0.030* 0.028* 0.031* 0.042* 0.032* 0.033* 
  08:50 - 
09:00 
0.024 0.005 0.029* 0.031* 0.005 0.019* 
  09:00 -
16:00 
0.350* 0.465* 0.406* 0.417* 0.460* 0.420* 
  16:00 - 
16:10 
0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.019 0.003 0.006 
  16:10 - 
16:20 
0.012 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.001 
  16:20 - 
16:30 
0.015 0.000 -0.004 -0.01 0.003 0.001 
Closing 
Auction/Post 
Close 
  16:30 - 
16:38 
-0.032* -0.03 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.014 
  16:38 - 
16:50 
0.016 0.052 -0.034 -0.031 -0.025 -0.004 
 
Days with zero 
price change 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
 Table 3: Price Discovery per Trade and by Time Period for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The Weighted Price Contribution per Trade (WPCT)  is computed by the pound volume quintile for FTSE 100 stocks. 
The WPCT is computed by dividing the WPC per trading interval by the weighted ratio of trades executed during that 
period (interval). If for each day, tk,s  
 is the number of executed trades in time period k for contract s, and ts  is the total 
sum of tk,s  for all the periods, then WPCTk is defined as: 
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The final row shows the fraction of days with their close-to-close return equalling 0. * indicates the WPCTs, which are 
significantly different from 0 at 1% level. The data covers the trading period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
 
Time 
Periods 
  
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Highest 4th 3rd 2nd Lowest Overall 
Pre-
Open/Opening 
Auction 
  07:10 -
07:20 
99.24* 967.37* 374.12* -196.72* -144.38* 219.92* 
  07:20 - 
07:30 
331.57* -66.32* -104.47* 805.06* 320.11* 257.19* 
  07:30 - 
07:40 
94.24* -634.92* 573.85* -2205.55* -107.76* -456.03* 
  07:40 - 
07:50 
1109.12* 770.30* -532.08* 253.73* 357.23* 391.66* 
  07:50 - 
08:00 
26.74* 318.75* 338.74* -72.33* -36.51* 115.08* 
Open-
Close/NTH 
  08:00 - 
08:10 
1.93 8.56* 12.20* 11.37* 14.17* 9.64* 
  08:10 - 
08:20 
2.36 3.30 2.09 3.23 3.59 2.91 
  08:20 - 
08:30 
1.64 1.09 1.80 2.10 2.06 1.74 
  08:30 - 
08:40 
2.66 0.94 1.58 2.38 1.57 1.83 
  08:40 - 
08: 50 
1.73 1.49 1.64 2.40 2.06 1.86 
  08:50 - 
09:00 
1.40 0.28 1.56 1.75 0.31 1.06 
  09:00 -
16:00 
0.50 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.63 0.58 
  16:00 - 
16:10 
0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.60 0.10 0.21 
  16:10 - 
16:20 
0.37 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.04 
  16:20 - 
16:30 
0.31 0.00 -0.09 -0.17 0.05 0.02 
Closing 
Auction/Post 
Close 
  16:30 - 
16:38 
-0.58 -2.95 -0.17 0.07 -0.16 -0.76 
  16:38 - 
16:50 
28.05* 84.35* -54.55* -38.36* -21.72* -0.45 
 
Days with ‘0’ 
price change 
  0.02 0.012 0.008 0.00 0.012 0.0104 
 Table 4: Adverse Selection Costs by Period for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The table shows adverse selection costs components for FTSE 100 stocks trading between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. The estimates are computed by estimating 
the following time series model for each stock and time period using ordinary least squares:  
 
where  is the change in price from the previous retained trade,  is equal to 1 (-1) when the transaction at period t for stock k was a market maker sell (buy) and  is 
the aggregate buy-sell indicator used in encapsulating portfolio trading pressure, it equals 1(-1, 0) when the sum of 
  
Qk,t-1 across all FTSE stocks in the sample is positive 
(negative, zero). The adverse selection cost component is given as: 
  
2(b2,k + b1,k ). The lower level quintile observations are very low in number, and thus could not provide robust 
estimates, hence their exclusion from the estimated contents in the table below. The standard deviations of the adverse selection costs estimates are given in parenthesis. 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (tie-adjusted) tests are used to determine whether pre-open or post-NTH values are significantly different from the NTH period. The pre-open or post-
NTH periods that differ from the NTH at 1% level are denoted with *.  
 
Pound Volume 
Quintile 
Pre-Open Normal Trading 
Hours (NTH) 
(08:00:30-16:30) 
Post-NTH 
Pre-Opening Auction 
(07:10-07:50) 
Opening Auction 
(07:50:01-08:00) 
Closing Auction 
(16:30:01-16:38) 
Post-Close 
(16:38:01-16:50) 
Highest 
0.102* 
(0.090) 
0.935* 
(0.456) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.041* 
(0.033) 
0.093* 
(0.060) 
4 
0.069* 
(0.049) - 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
0.072* 
(0.031) 
3 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
- 
0.001 
(0.0006) 
0.021* 
(0.013) 
0.039* 
(0.018) 
2 
0.014* 
(0.011) 
- 
0.001 
(0.0007) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
Lowest 
0.046* 
(0.013) 
- 
0.005 
(0.002) 
0.023* 
(0.008) 
0.061* 
(0.029) 
Overall 
0.049* 
(0.033) 
0.935* 
(0.456) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.024* 
(0.011) 
0.056* 
(0.027) 

Pk ,t

Qk,t

QA ,t 1
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List of stocks used in this study 
ISIN RIC Constituent name 
Index 
Weight 
(%) 
Country 
ICB 
Supersector 
Code 
GB00B02J6398 ADM.L Admiral Group 0.14 UK 8500 
GB0000282623 AMEC.L Amec 0.19 UK 0500 
GB00B1XZS820 AAL.L Anglo American 1.19 UK 1700 
GB0000456144 ANTO.L Antofagasta 0.17 UK 1700 
GB0000595859 ARM.L ARM Holdings 0.83 UK 9500 
GB0006731235 ABF.L 
Associated British 
Foods 0.39 UK 3500 
GB0009895292 AZN.L AstraZeneca 2.41 UK 4500 
GB0002162385 AV.L Aviva 0.70 UK 8500 
GB0009697037 BAB.L 
Babcock 
International Group 0.26 UK 2700 
GB0002634946 BAES.L BAE Systems 0.88 UK 2700 
GB0031348658 BARC.L Barclays 2.56 UK 8300 
GB0008762899 BG.L BG Group 2.41 UK 0500 
GB0000566504 BLT.L BHP Billiton 2.31 UK 1700 
GB0007980591 BP.L BP 4.89 UK 0500 
GB0002875804 BATS.L 
British American 
Tobacco 3.77 UK 3700 
GB0001367019 BLND.L British Land Co 0.35 UK 8600 
GB0001411924 BSY.L 
British Sky 
Broadcasting Group 0.51 UK 5500 
GB0030913577 BT.L BT Group 1.62 UK 6500 
GB00B23K0M20 CPI.L Capita 0.39 UK 2700 
GB00B033F229 CNA.L Centrica 1.14 UK 7500 
GB0005331532 CPG.L Compass Group 0.93 UK 5700 
IE0001827041 CRH.I CRH 0.64 UK 2300 
GB0002335270 CRDA.L Croda International 0.21 UK 1300 
GB0002374006 DGE.L Diageo 2.97 UK 3500 
GB00B19NLV48 EXPN.L Experian 0.71 UK 2700 
GB0009252882 GSK.L GlaxoSmithKline 4.60 UK 4500 
JE00B4T3BW64 GLEN.L Glencore Xstrata 1.94 UK 1700 
GB00B1VZ0M25 HRGV.L 
Hargreaves 
Lansdown 0.13 UK 8700 
GB0005405286 HSBA.L HSBC Hldgs 7.48 UK 8300 
GB0004579636 IMI.L IMI 0.28 UK 2700 
GB0004544929 IMT.L 
Imperial Tobacco 
Group 1.34 UK 3700 
 GB00B85KYF37 IHG.L 
InterContinental 
Hotels Group 0.28 UK 5700 
GB0033195214 KGF.L Kingfisher 0.55 UK 5300 
GB0031809436 LAND.L 
Land Securities 
Group 0.43 UK 8600 
GB0005603997 LGEN.L 
Legal & General 
Group 0.69 UK 8500 
GB0008706128 LLOY.L 
Lloyds Banking 
Group 2.13 UK 8300 
GB0031274896 MKS.L 
Marks & Spencer 
Group 0.48 UK 5300 
GB0005758098 MGGT.L Meggitt 0.26 UK 2700 
GB00B8L59D51 MRON.L Melrose Industries 0.23 UK 2700 
GB0006043169 MRW.L 
Morrison (Wm) 
Supermarkets 0.36 UK 5300 
GB00B08SNH34 NG.L National Grid 1.63 UK 7500 
GB0032089863 NXT.L Next 0.47 UK 5300 
GB00B77J0862 OML.L Old Mutual 0.55 UK 8500 
GB0006776081 PSON.L Pearson 0.61 UK 5500 
GB0007099541 PRU.L Prudential 1.76 UK 8500 
GB00B24CGK77 RB.L 
Reckitt Benckiser 
Group 1.75 UK 3700 
GB00B2B0DG97 REL.L Reed Elsevier 0.59 UK 5500 
GG00B62W2327 RSL.L Resolution 0.26 UK 8500 
GB0007188757 RIO.L Rio Tinto 2.26 UK 1700 
GB00B63H8491 RR.L 
Rolls-Royce 
Holdings 1.25 UK 2700 
GB00B7T77214 RBS.L 
Royal Bank Of 
Scotland Group 0.45 UK 8300 
GB00B03MLX29 RDSa.L 
Royal Dutch Shell 
A 4.65 UK 0500 
GB00B03MM408 RDSb.L 
Royal Dutch Shell 
B 3.22 UK 0500 
GB0006616899 RSA.L 
RSA Insurance 
Group 0.27 UK 8500 
GB0004835483 SAB.L SABMiller 1.78 UK 3500 
GB00B8C3BL03 SGE.L Sage Group 0.22 UK 9500 
GB00B019KW72 SBRY.L Sainsbury (J) 0.33 UK 5300 
GB0002405495 SDR.L Schroders 0.17 UK 8700 
GB00B1FH8J72 SVT.L Severn Trent 0.25 UK 7500 
GB0009223206 SN.L Smith & Nephew 0.41 UK 4500 
GB00B1WY2338 SMIN.L Smiths Group 0.33 UK 2700 
GB0007908733 SSE.L SSE 0.85 UK 7500 
GB0004082847 STAN.L Standard Chartered 1.76 UK 8300 
GB00B16KPT44 SL.L Standard Life 0.49 UK 8500 
GB0008847096 TSCO.L Tesco 1.73 UK 5300 
 GB0001500809 TLW.L Tullow Oil 0.56 UK 0500 
GB00B10RZP78 ULVR.L Unilever 1.77 UK 3500 
GB00B39J2M42 UU.L 
United Utilities 
Group 0.28 UK 7500 
GB00B16GWD56 VOD.L Vodafone Group 6.31 UK 6500 
JE00B8N69M54 WOS.L Wolseley 0.52 UK 2700 
    Total weight 91.23     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
